A.   diepolar

B.   multipolar

C.   tripolar

D.   unipolar

A.   States believe that a balance of power provides perpetual peace.

B.   States do not trust each other due to the anarchic nature of the international system.

C.   States believe that a balance of power ensures interstate cooperation.

D.   States are trying to maintain instability in the international system.

A.   enhances the sovereignty of less-powerful states

B.   causes instability in the international system

C.   tends to allow conflicts among middle powers or small states

D.   reduces anarchy and deters aggression in the international system

A.   exist for one issue at one time

B.   are formalized in written treaties

C.   are frequently broken without consequences

D.   concern economic issues

A.   great powers

B.   client states

C.   middle powers

D.   small powers

A.   states' decisions always have beneficial consequences

B.   states are unitary actors that can think about their actions coherently and make choices

C.   states are very rarely capable of performing a cost-benefit analysis on actions

D.   while a state can identify its interests, putting priorities on them is nearly impossible

A.   Zero-sum games are more typical in international political economy, whereas non-zero-sum games are more typical in international security.

B.   In a zero-sum game, one player's gain is by definition equal to the other's loss, whereas in a non-zero-sum game, players' gains and losses cancel each other out.

C.   In a zero-sum game, both players win, whereas in a non-zero-sum game, both players lose.

D.   In a zero-sum game, one player's gain is by definition equal to the other's loss, whereas in a non-zero-sum game, it is possible for both players to gain or lose.

A.   both prisoners confess, thereby ensuring the best outcome for both

B.   both prisoners confess, thereby ensuring each is worse off than if they both did not confess

C.   neither prisoner confesses, thereby ensuring the best outcome for both

D.   one prisoner decides not to confess, believing he can do so later

A.   Compellence

B.   Escalation

C.   An arms race

D.   Deterrence

A.   It is relatively easy to determine the national interest, because all states are interested in power.

B.   It is easy to calculate intangible political benefits against the tangible costs of a war.

C.   All international relations scholars accept the assumption that states are rational actors.

D.   Decision makers often lack information necessary to accurately estimate the costs of an action.