Business 497A - Strategic Management System » Summer 2023 » Guided Case Governance and Activist Investors Outside of the U.S. Ch 10
Need help with your exam preparation?
Get Answers to this exam for $6 USD.
Get Answers to all exams in [ Business 497A - Strategic Management System ] course for $25 USD.
Existing Quiz Clients Login here
Question #1
The Japanese Financial Services Agency has introduced a stewardship code that calls on investors to exercise their shareholder rights, for example, by pressing for greater returns. In other words, what are investors in Japan encouraged to become?
A.
Concentrated shareholders
B.
Large-block shareholders
C.
Institutional owners
D.
Activist investors
Question #2
In recent years, investors in Germany have taken a stronger role in managing firms by more assertively exercising their shareholders' rights. However, governance regulations in Germany prevent corporate governance from working in that country exactly as it does in the United States. For example, which of the following common outcomes of shareholder involvement has NOT occurred in Germany?
A.
Focused diversification
B.
High CEO turnover
C.
Riskier strategies
D.
Higher returns
Question #3
Two investment funds—Cevian Capital and Elliott Management—are described as being involved in the management of various German firms, such as ThyssenKrupp, Bilfinder, and Kabel Deutschland. What does this tell us about these institutional owners?
A.
They must be foreign investors.
B.
They must be large-block shareholders.
C.
They must have employees that sit on the boards of these companies.
D.
They are part of the market for corporate control; thus, these companies must be undervalued.
Question #4
Firms around the world can choose among a handful of options for enhancing the effectiveness of their boards of directors. Which of the following methods might Japanese firms find difficult to adopt because it doesn't fit with traditional cultural values?
A.
Establishing formal processes for evaluating board members' performance because it violates the Japanese custom of "saving face"
B.
Strengthening their accounting control systems because it violates the Japanese respect for privacy
C.
Modifying their executive compensation packages because it runs contrary to the Japanese preference for rewards
D.
Including outsiders with different perspectives because it runs contrary to the Japanese emphasis on family and consensus
Question #5
Effectively using executive compensation as a governance mechanism is particularly challenging for multinational firms, such as Brazilian meatpacker JBS-Friboi. Why?
A.
The interests of the owners are best served by less uniformity in the compensation packages, but a diverse array of plans requires more monitoring, which increases agency costs.
B.
The interests of the owners are best served by more uniformity in the compensation packages, but tighter controls require more monitoring, which increases agency costs.
C.
The interests of the owners are best served by less uniformity in the compensation packages, but a diverse array of plans requires more external monitoring which increases government costs.
D.
The interests of the owners are best served by offering more generous compensation packages, which increases overall costs.
Question #6
Despite potentially limited resources, owners in emerging economies are still participating in the market for corporate control. According to the mini-case, which of the following is the primary means by which they are exercising influence in developed and developing economies?
A.
Stock connect programs
B.
Financial services agencies
C.
Sovereign wealth funds
D.
Supervisory tiers
Question #7
In recent years, Hong Kong-listed companies have wanted to appear to be more "Westernized," or modern, in terms of corporate governance. Which of the following is NOT one of the common steps these firms have taken to achieve their goal?
A.
Loosening restrictions on foreign investment and ownership
B.
Modifying the make-up, function, and operation of their boards of directors
C.
Adopting two-tiered board structures
D.
Operating in a more transparent fashion
Question #8
In 2015, Japan adopted a new corporate governance code that strongly encourages domestic firms to elect more independent outside directors to their boards than was previously the custom in that country. Why does the Japanese government want to strengthen the country's corporate governance mechanisms in this way?
A.
It aligns corporate governance with the Japanese value of obligation.
B.
It makes Japanese firms more competitive with American and German firms.
C.
It gives the Japanese government greater control over domestic businesses.
D.
It attracts foreign investors who feel more confident due to stronger corporate governance.
Question #9
As more and more firms around the world tighten their corporate governance mechanisms by setting up boards of directors made up of insiders, outsiders, and related outsiders, what will be the most likely effect on these firms' ethical standards and behavior?
A.
The creation of a board of directors has little to no effect on a firm's ethical standards and behavior.
B.
It is easy for top-level managers to hide any unethical behavior from a board of directors; thus, this type of behavior is likely to increase.
C.
The creation of a board of directors will most likely result in stronger boundaries that will deter unethical behavior among top-level managers.
D.
The creation of a board of directors will require a firm to codify and document its ethical standards in a written code of ethics.
Question #10
Many firms in mainland China are still operated by their founder-owners. In order to grow, they may need to seek additional expertise and capital from outsider investors, which could potentially necessitate the owners turning over the management of their firms to managerial specialists. Which of the following scenarios would be the most likely to protect the founder-owners' rights while ensuring the best strategic decisions for the firm?
A.
The founder-owners should retain enough equity to have influence but not major control.
B.
The founder-owners should surrender all control of their firms to directors and managers.
C.
The only way to protect the founder-owners' rights is to refuse any capital investment from outsiders and retain full control.
D.
The founder-owners should retain majority control of their firms.
Need help with your exam preparation?
Get Answers to this exam for $6 USD.
Get Answers to all exams in [ Business 497A - Strategic Management System ] course for $25 USD.
Existing Quiz Clients Login here